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The Role of Non-judicial Mechanisms in Protecting Individual Rights: 
The China and Hong Kong Experiences∗ 
 
Ren Yue 
Department of Politics & Sociology 
Lingnan University, Hong Kong 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study intends to examine, from a socio-legal perspective, the different 
ways of individual rights protection in the Chinese Mainland and Hong Kong.  
The common misperception is that as Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region is allowed to maintain its legal system inherited from the British 
colonial times, its residents enjoy more and wider individual freedoms than 
their Mainland compatriots.  However, a comparison of relevant individual 
rights provisions of both Chinese Constitution and Hong Kong Basic Law 
finds that there is virtually no significant difference between them.   The true 
differences of individual rights protection lie in various non-judicial 
mechanisms rooted in the different socio-economic-political environments.  
In the Chinese Mainland, those non-judicial mechanisms are usually related 
with social networks of the individuals.  In Hong Kong, more likely they are 
found in various means of public pressure. 
 
Keywords: individual rights protection, non-judicial mechanism, social-
network, China and Hong Kong. 
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Both China (the Mainland) and its recently recovered territory the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) have pledged to 
implement the provisions of the two important international human rights 
documents: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  In the 
Chinese Constitution and the Basic Law of HKSAR (the mini-constitution of 
this former British colony), the fundamental individual rights of Chinese 
citizens and Hong Kong residents have been written and the legal systems of 
these two Chinese societies have been enforced to protect these individual 
rights.  While Hong Kong has been generally regarded as a rule of law 
society, the Chinese government has also been accelerating the pace of its 
build up as a rule of law state since the reform era began in the late 1970s, or 
at least it claims to be doing so.  However, as in most the civilised societies, 
the legal systems in China and Hong Kong sometimes may not be able to 
cover all the areas where individual rights are concerned.  Incidents of 
violations of individual freedom and other civil rights still exist in China and, 
to a less degree, Hong Kong.  In many cases, people will either prefer to or be 
forced to resort some non-judicial means to seek redress for government 
injustices and individual wrongful actions. 
This paper intends to examine the ways of implementing the 
constitutional provisions of individual rights in China and the HKSAR.  The 
focus is on how non-judicial mechanisms work in the two Chinese societies.  
It argues that despite the relatively similar provisions of individual rights in 
both legal systems, and the fact that these provisions are not substantially 
different from most of the civilised societies in the contemporary world, 
people in the Chinese mainland and HKSAR often seek protections of their 
rights and freedoms outside the available judicial frameworks.  In order to 
understand this phenomenon, this paper takes a socio-legal perspective and 
finds answers in the legal traditions, social strata, and cultural heritages of 
these two Chinese societies. It identifies and discusses the various non-
judicial means practised in both the Mainland and HKSAR, and argues that 
due to their different socio-economic backgrounds and cultural histories, 
different non-judicial mechanisms are respectively emphasized.  It finds that 
while in both legal systems the administrative authorities are important to 
provide protections of individual rights, the Chinese people often prefer to 
defend their rights through non-judicial means.  Some of the non-judicial 
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mechanisms are found in many societies, but some are rather uniquely 
Chinese.  In Hong Kong, it is mainly the civic society’s “watch-dogs”, such 
as the media, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), religious groups and 
public pressure that are the most significant forces to defend individual rights 
for its residents.  In the Mainland, it is mainly the various social networks 
such as Chinese Communist Party (CCP) party apparatus, work units, 
neighborhood and communities, and kinship, etc. that take up this 
responsibility. 
The next section gives a brief discussion on the socio-legal studies of 
the individual rights in the two legal systems.  Then an analytical comparison 
of the constitutional provisions of individual rights in both Mainland China 
(hereafter ‘China’) and HKSAR is presented.   This study then turns to 
examine the conditions that nurture those various non-judicial mechanisms 
and how these mechanisms work.  With some typical case studies in the 
status of individual rights protection in China and HKSAR, it concludes that 
some socio-legal and socio-economic differences are main contributors to the 
rise and persistence of non-judicial mechanisms.  The final section discusses 
some important characteristics of the various non-judicial mechanisms 
deployed in the two legal systems. 
 
I. A Socio-legal Approach to the Study of Individual Rights 
 
A legal system is the social-cultural construct of the society in which it 
is rooted.  Legal systems usually reflect the social hierarchy of a given 
contemporary society.  Specifically, laws reflect the will of the established 
and the “just” laws are those that protect the majority’s interests and also 
provide the minority legal means to correct the wrongs done by members of 
the established majority.  In a legal study of individual rights, one usually 
examines the constitutional and other legal provisions of the rights and put 
them in the context of how the judicial system implements these provisions 
and the strong and weak points of such a system.  However, this approach 
mainly has two built-in defects.  First, it often ignores the cognitive limits of 
the legal professionals like legislators, judges, lawyers, and legal scholars, 
who make, apply, interpret, rationalise, and implement laws.  More 
importantly, it detaches the social environment in which those legal 
professionals live, and therefore often gets distorted pictures of the reality. 
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Unlike legal studies, a socio-legal approach of the individual rights 
looks at the social-legal environment in which individual rights are protected 
and whether such protections are adequate for all the people in the society.  
Although there is a lack of consensus on the definition of this approach, it is 
generally accepted that it involves the study of legal phenomena through an 
inter-disciplinary perspective.  For example, Emile Durkheim’s study on the 
sociology of law inspires many legal sociologists to explore this field and has 
yielded fruitful results. 1   Following the footsteps of the pioneers, recent 
publications have added more social sciences elements to the socio-legal 
approach.  W. T. Murphy argues that “the traditional vision of the role of law 
is rooted in a complex set of hierarchical assumptions,” in which the interests 
of the government and the governed are intertwined together. 2  Brian 
Tamanaha suggests a realistic socio-legal theory in which he attributes the 
concept of law to two major sources: the patterned behavour of the society 
and the institutionalised norm enforcement.3  Some others claim that factors 
like religion, culture, economic and political statuses should be included in 
the socio-legal approach. 4   In light of the various methodological and 
theoretical developments, the UK-based Socio-Legal Studies Association 
simply summarises that “[w]hat binds the socio-legal community is an 
approach to the study of legal phenomena which is multi or inter-disciplinary 
in its approach.”5   However, it is generally understood that these elements 
are important for the composition of a social-legal environment.  First, such 
an environment is guarded by its legal system.  What kind of legal tradition 
does the society have?  Is there a consensual legal culture?  Are its residents 
familiar with the legal system?  Secondly, the environment is based on the 
level of economic development.  Is it an affluent society?  How smoothly 
does the economic system operate?  How is the social wealth distributed?  To 
what extent it can satisfy its residents’ basic needs? Thirdly, the environment 
is maintained by its political system.  How effective are the governments at 
various levels of the society?  In what way does the government rule the 
society?  Finally, such an environment is supported by the members of the 
society.  How knowledgeable are the people about the environment?  How 
high is the general morale of the society? 
It is quite obvious that the application of a socio-legal approach to the 
study of constitutionally guaranteed individual rights needs a thorough 
understanding of the legal system under study.  The Chairman of Hong Kong 
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Bar Association has a neat comparison of the difference between the two 
legal systems in China and Hong Kong.  “Hong Kong practises the common 
law, while PRC [People’s Republic of China] has basically a civil law system.  
During the colonial era, the British transplanted to Hong Kong the institution 
of the Rule of Law as it has been practised in the United Kingdom.  PRC only 
came out of the Cultural Revolution in 1979 when law faculties were closed 
and lawyers were disbanded and has since had only 22 years to rebuild her 
legal system from scratch.”6  The return of Hong Kong from the United 
Kingdom to the “Central Kingdom” does not affect the existing legal system 
in the former British colony.  Common law is still practised in Hong Kong, 
and the legal protection of its residents’ civil and political rights are 
nominally guaranteed in the Basic Law.  Hong Kong residents live in a rule-
of-law society, and the legal culture is inherited from Britain, combined with 
Chinese tradition.  The judicial power remains independent from the 
executive and legislative branches of the HKSAR, except that the ultimate 
interpretive power of the Basic Law rests in the hands of the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress of the PRC.  When different 
opinions exist between Hong Kong’s highest judicial tribunal, -- the Court of 
Final Appeals, -- and the HKSAR government, the central government may 
step in to support the HKSAR government.  The issue of judicial 
independence is at stake, as reflected in the “right of abode” cases. 
China, on the other hand, has developed a quite different legal system.  
In the past two decades or so, China has been undertaking dramatic social, 
economic, and even political changes, which inevitably affect its legal setting.  
To bring this country that has no democratic experiences in its history from a 
rule of man to a rule of law requires tedious effort by the Chinese 
government.  Caught between the need to retain the legitimacy of communist 
power and the desire to merge into the democratic trend of the international 
society, Chinese leaders have cautiously relaxed their tight control over the 
judiciary and allowed limited legal reforms in this area.  In this transitional 
period, some legal scholars have been openly introducing western political 
and legal cultures.  A lawyer system has been established and there have been 
active efforts to change people’s minds about going to court.  In recent years, 
the Chinese people have become more aware of their constitutional rights and 
there are a few cases in which ordinary Chinese citizens sue government 
branches for the latter’s abuse of power.  This gesture was almost unheard of 
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either in imperial China or during Mao’s rule.  As a result, a number of legal 
norms have been borrowed from outside and implanted in the Chinese legal 
system.  However, China at present is still best described as having a legal 
system that is ruled by law rather than the rule of law.  This is mainly due to 
the fact that the Communist Party is still in control of all the government 
branches including the judiciary, which cannot exert its independent role.  In 
addition, most of the government legal professionals are members of the 
Party and many of them have little exposure to Western legal thought.  Some 
of the judges do not even have formal legal training. 
Not only do the two Chinese societies have different legal cultures and 
systems, they are also at different economic development stages and have 
different economic systems, though the line between the capitalist system of 
Hong Kong and the socialist economic system of China has been blurred in 
the recent years.  As one of the four “little dragons” in East Asia, Hong Kong 
has a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita similar to that of advanced 
countries.  The rapid economic growth in the 1970s through to the mid-1990s 
has made Hong Kong an envy of its mainland counterpart.  As one of the 
world’s freest economies and major trading partners, Hong Kong has been a 
dreamland for many Chinese.  However, the rather narrowly structured Hong 
Kong economy also has its vulnerabilities, which have become more and 
more apparent since the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  The booming property 
market bubble burst and remains even now in a pitiful situation.  With a more 
open Chinese market, Hong Kong’s role as a bridge between the mainland 
and outside world has been shrinking and its industrial infrastructure has been 
collapsing with factories moving to the mainland and elsewhere.  Middle 
classes suffer from their investments and the size of underprivileged groups is 
growing.  Social wealth has been concentrated on a few rich entrepreneurs 
and the gap between the rich and the poor has been widening to a dangerous 
level.  This worsening economic environment intensifies social conflicts and 
endangers the individual rights of its residents. 
China’s economic development has been a miracle in the past two 
decades with an average of 7-8% annual GDP growth in the past two decades 
or so.  The privatisation movement started from late 1970s has virtually 
paralysed its central planning system.  Except for a few giant state-owned 
enterprises which are more likely to be burdens than assets to the government, 
the Chinese economic system is moving closer to a free economy like that in 
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Hong Kong.  Armed with Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic economic policies, 
quite a few Chinese have reached the rank of a middle class; some have even 
joined the group of the world’s richest people.  However, the loopholes 
which exist in this mixture of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” allow 
some governmental officials and private entrepreneurs to get rich quick at the 
expense of ordinary citizens and underprivileged workers.  Violations of the 
latter’s constitutionally guaranteed rights, such as the right to work and the 
right to rest, have occurred more frequently.  Social disorders and 
dissatisfactions become common phenomena and the legal protection of 
individual rights has been challenged from time to time.  The government’s 
crushing of a cult called “Falungong”, many of whose members are retired 
and unemployed citizens, illustrates the seriousness of this social problem. 
A civic society is a necessary condition to implement the constitutional 
rights of a nation’s citizens.  Neither of the political systems in these two 
Chinese societies has a democratic government in the generally accepted 
sense of democracy.  In Hong Kong, the former British rulers did not 
encourage a wide participation of Hong Kong residents in politics.  The 
appointed officials and the apolitical civil servants made the government a 
bureaucratic machine to carry out policies decided in accordance with the 
national interests of Britain.  After the handover of sovereignty, Hong Kong 
has been administered by a small-circle selected Chief Executive. Its 
legislature, with only a handful of directly elected legislators and a limited 
legislative power, is not capable of providing a kind of check and balance 
system to the executive branch.  The political participation of Hong Kong 
residents remain in a primitive level and apolitical attitudes are remarkable.  
The highly commercialised sub-political culture further alienates its citizens 
from making collective effort to defend their entitled constitutional rights.  In 
the past few years, a series of what in most civilised nations would be 
considered fundamental issues of individual rights, such as freedom of 
demonstrations, freedom of criticising government policies, and the right of 
abode, only attracted a few political activists.  Even the protests against the 
proposed Article 23 legislation on national security have been comparatively 
small-scale. The general apathy of the public to politics seals the fate of any 
political movement that runs against the will of the government. 
For a long period of time in the history of the PRC, individual rights 
were regarded as “bourgeois” by the revolutionary leaders.  Individualism 
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would be criticised and individual initiatives discouraged.  The Chinese were 
taught to give up their own private desires, sometimes even dignity, to obey 
the orders from the central government and the authority.  In  the PRC’s 
previous constitutions, individual rights were minimised and buried in the 
more prominent duties.  The political culture in China was to stress Chinese 
citizens’ collective social and economic rights. The concept of human rights 
was non-existent until the late 1970’s.  Even then, it was not interpreted in 
any positive way except when talking about the people's basic physical needs.  
During Mao's time, law for many Chinese meant to regulate the behaviour of 
the citizens, not of the government.  In other words, laws were used by the 
government to punish the vicious and to protect the righteous.  As for the 
government itself, whatever it did was on behalf of the people and should 
never be questioned.  This sorrowful situation began to change during Deng’s 
era.  The Chinese leaders began to realise the importance of respecting 
individual rights and began to make constitutional arrangement to meet the 
international standards of civil rights protection.  In the late 1990s, China 
joined the two important international covenants on civil, political, social and 
economic rights.   
The current constitution, passed in 1982, includes almost all the clauses 
recognised internationally as “fundamental rights and duties of citizens.”  
With the emergence of a sizeable middle class as a result of rapid economic 
privatisation in the late 1970’s, the people’s awareness of their own rights 
were increased.  An accumulated dissatisfaction amongst students, workers 
and peasants with corruptive and inefficient government performances 
reached a climax in the spring of 1989. At one time even the government-
controlled journalists were beginning to report events and make comments 
according to their own judgements.  However, without a properly nurtured 
culture of rule of law, such a movement is doomed to be ephemeral.  The 
Chinese leadership soon felt the threats to the stability of its regime and 
began to take actions.  The tragic ending of the June 4 military crushing of 
the students’ demonstrations was just an example of how difficult it was to 
safeguard individual rights in China.7 
A careful examination of the socio-legal environments in China and 
Hong Kong reveals one fact: it is very difficult to protect Chinese people’s 
individual rights merely through the constitutional means.  Other mechanisms 
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have to be applied in order to effectively implement those constitutional 
guarantees the people are entitled to have. 
 
II. The Constitutional Guarantees of China and Hong Kong: the Myth and 
the Reality 
 
Very few people would deny that laws on paper and laws in practice 
are two different matters and more often than not the two do not match.  If 
the current world fad is democracy, then one would expect that even the most 
authoritarian regimes would like to attach “democratic” to their nations’ 
names.  Modern constitutional guarantees of civil rights and civil liberties 
have blossomed since the European and North American revolutionary years 
of the 18th century, become the prevailing trend after the dominance of 
western democracies.  China, a communist country that gradually has 
abandoned its Marxist doctrines since the late 1970s, has adopted in its 1982 
constitution most of the features of the western civil rights and civil liberties 
ideals.  This change also affected the drafting process of the Basic Law (BL) 
of the HKSAR, which came into force from 1 July 1997. 
 
1. What are the Citizens’ Promised Individual Rights? 
 
Individual rights are changing concepts according to the development 
and the current consensus of the members of a given society.  Some 
fundamental rights have been generally recognised by the international 
society, some only established in a few democracies.  Since the end of the 
Second World War, the general trend is to include more and more individual 
rights in nations’ constitutions.  The written provisions of constitutional 
protections in both China and Hong Kong do not have much difference.  
They all have the world’s most commonly promulgated individual rights 
clauses. Both the 1982 Constitution of the PRC and the Basic Law of the 
HKSAR guarantee their citizens,  
1) The rights and freedoms of their residents/citizens. (PRC Cons. Ch. 2; 
BL Art. 4;) 
2) The right of private ownership of property (PRC Cons. Art. 13; BL Art. 
6) 
3) Equal before the law (PRC Cons. Art. 33; BL Art. 25) 
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4) Freedom of speech, of the press and of publication; of association and 
of assembly, of procession and of demonstration; and Hong Kong 
residents also have the right and freedom to form and join trade unions 
and to strike. (PRC Cons. Art. 35; BL Art. 27) 
5) Voting rights. (PRC Cons. Art. 34; BL Art. 26) 
6) Freedom of religion. (PRC Cons. Art. 36; BL Art. 32) 
7) The inviolability of the freedom of the person. (PRC Cons. Art. 37; BL 
Art. 28) and of the homes and other premises (PRC Cons. Art. 39; BL 
Art 29) 
8) The freedom of private communications. (PRC Cons. Art. 40; BL Art. 
30). 
 
In addition, Hong Kong residents also enjoy the freedom of movement 
within the territory and of emigration to other countries and regions (Art. 31); 
the freedom of choice of occupations (Art. 33); and the right to confidential 
legal advice, access to the courts, choice of lawyers for timely protection of 
their lawful rights and interest or for representation in the courts, and to 
judicial remedies. (Art. 35)  In the Basic Law, a clause (Art. 39) is designated 
to allowing the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights to remain in force. 
Needless to say, constitutional arrangements on paper do not always 
guarantee citizens’ rights in practice.  In China, the rule of law principle 
works primarily to ensure sustainable economic development and social 
stability.  Therefore, when the nation’s economic growth and especially when 
its domestic stability are at stake, the Chinese government would not hesitate 
to temporarily suspend or limit some individual rights even guaranteed by the 
constitution.  The government would either amend the constitution (e.g., the 
abolishment of the right to post “big-character posters” criticising 
government) or to make implementing regulations that would make ordinary 
citizens very difficult to act their constitutional rights (e.g., the very 
restrictive and harsh terms on how to apply for demonstrations and 
assemblies).  In general, the exercise of individual rights in China has been 
subject to a number of factors.  First, it depends on the nature of the rights.  
Some rights likely to be implemented are those that are less sensitive to the 
stability of the regime and are generally in accordance with the trend of 
China’s economic development, such as the protection of private property.  
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Some, like the freedom of speech and of assembly, are carried out with more 
restrictions.  Secondly, it depends on the timing of the political atmosphere.  
When the government sees the practice of certain rights is likely to go out of 
control, it would intervene.  Thirdly, the Chinese leadership’s personal 
preferences are crucial to the success of carrying out individual rights 
protection policies.  When they need public support to consolidate their 
power base or when they want to win international appreciation, they are 
likely to grant more flexibility on individual rights.  The policies of both 
Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin in their early years in power have illustrated 
this point.  Finally, it depends on the geographical or ethnical division of the 
country.  In general, ethnic minorities and officially sanctioned religious 
groups enjoy greater freedom and rights than those Han Chinese and less 
manifested religious groups.  For example, in Tibet and Xinjiang, minorities 
are usually not subject to the family planning policies and are given greater 
freedom to practise their religious rituals. 
As listed above, Hong Kong residents enjoy greater individual rights 
than mainland Chinese and their constitutional rights are less subject to 
political changes and/or leadership preferences.  However, in the past few 
years the government’s policies and regulations concerning certain civil 
rights issues have been under intensive public scrutiny and even evoked 
heated public debates.  In these issues, a number of laws and government 
behaviour have been considered by many as encroachments on Hong Kong 
residents’ individual rights.  Notably are these discussions: the issue of Public 
Order Ordinance, which puts more restrictions on freedom of expression; the 
anti-cult legislation that may make Hong Kong less autonomous than is 
guaranteed by the “one country, two systems” principle; the issue of Chief 
Executive elections, which have been criticised as “non-democratic small-
circle” elections; the denial of education to children on recognizance; and 
new security legislation as allowed under Article 23 of the Basic Law.8 
 
2. Does Status Make Any Difference? 
 
The “rule of law” mainly composes two fundamental principles: 
legality and equality.  The former means that all the acts of government and 
social behavior of citizens must be in accordance of law.  The latter means 
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that in front of the law, everyone should be treated equally, regardless of 
his/her personal background and social positions. 
No existing legal system is perfect. Different systems have different 
weaknesses.  No such a system can fulfill with a hundred percent confidence 
the functions it claims to have. With such an assumption, it is questionable 
whether individual rights can be protected by the common will of the 
communities.   This common will, often in the form of law, can be easily 
manipulated by the established in society and become tools for their own 
profits.  Depending on the nature of the individual rights, community power 
can be “coercive” in nature.9  In other words, legality may not necessarily 
achieve the fairness it is assumed to have.  In a highly developed democratic 
society, the principle of legality has been repeatedly tested and modified so 
that its unfair nature may at least be restricted and neutralised.  However, in a 
society where law-making process is less transparent, legality may become 
the accomplice to the unfair activities of some corrupt officials and social 
celebrities. 
The principle of equality is even harder to achieve.  The two most 
common obstacles that stand in the way of protecting individual rights 
equally by a given legal system are the abuse of power and the excessive 
weight of wealth.  Both give advantages to a certain group/groups over 
another group/groups.  In the two Chinese societies under study, the two 
obstacles are not equally obvious presented and often they cannot be easily 
convergent.  In China, the main problem is the abuse of power by the Chinese 
officials.  In HKSAR, the unequal protection of individual rights is mainly 
reflected in the unequal distribution of social wealth. 
In China, the principle of “rule of law” has only been stressed in the 
last two decades.  In the world’s most populous society, there is a general 
lack of legal professionals and particularly those who specialise in 
constitutional rights defense.  For many ordinary Chinese, the logic is not 
about using the constitution to protect their rights and fulfill their obligations.  
Rather, they regard the constitution as a document that gives governments at 
various levels their legitimacy.  And it is the responsibility of the 
governments to protect their individual rights and to explain those rights.  
This common misperception and ready dependency on officialdom have 
helped those government officials who tend to abuse their power for personal 
benefits. 
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Corruption of government officials has been a serious problem in China 
in recent years.  It has been the main cause of several major public riots.   The 
Chinese government has made obvious efforts to crush the corruption of its 
officials by bringing quite a few high-ranking officials, including national 
and provincial leaders, to justice.  Yet it has reached a scale that to bring all 
the corrupt officials in China to justice is almost impossible.  These officials 
abuse the power they have often at the expense of ordinary citizens’ rights.  
Yet, they often can get away without punishment.  Several factors have made 
it possible.  First of all, these officials usually have a wide official network 
base that connects them with other officials.  They may count on other 
officials’ help to avoid punishment by law either through the latter’s willing 
cooperation (e.g., because they are friends, relatives, etc.) or reluctant 
assistance (e.g., because the knowledge of the others’ own dirty activities).  
Secondly, these officials usually have enormous power and other resources at 
their disposal.  In a society where government operations are not transparent 
and where power means authority, it is relatively easy for them to hide what 
they have done wrong from the general public.  Finally, these officials 
usually have better access to information, which can help them to divert 
public attention for their corrupt or even criminal behaviour. 
The more than two decades of economic reform in China has given rise 
to an affluent class whose members too can have advantages in front of law.  
Although wealth itself does not necessarily give those people privileges like 
those officials, it can put money to “good” use such as bribing officials and 
silencing ordinary people’s grievances when the latter’s rights are violated by 
those wealthy people.  However, in comparison with the power resource of 
those corrupt officials, money still has its limitations for the rich in China.  In 
recent years, among those rich law-breakers, many committed the crime of 
bribery of government officials.  The most shocking example is the Yuan Hua 
case.  The main suspect, a Hong Kong merchant currently under custody in 
Canada, is on China’s most wanted list for his crimes of smuggling and 
bribery that had already brought death sentences to more than a dozen high-
ranking officials and important military, customs, and police individuals.10 
In Hong Kong, the situation is quite different.  Due to the government’s 
policy to give high salaries to civil servants in order to prevent corruptive 
behaviour and the relatively independent nature and effective work of the 
Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC), public officials are less 
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prone to corruption and other crimes.  This is not to say, however, that they 
are always equal before the law as other residents.  As their career 
developments are likely to be derived from a relatively narrow base (e.g., 
most of the civil servants are top graduates from the University of Hong 
Kong or the Chinese University, and many of them have at different times 
been colleagues to others due to the frequent shuffling of civil servants), they 
may also get special treatment.  The real privileged people before the law, 
however, are those who are rich and famous.  In the past few years, the 
HKSAR government’s Justice Department has pardoned or given mercy to 
several famous public figures including the former boss of a local newspaper 
and the son of a judge.  Each incident made the public furious and led them to 
question the equality principle of the law. 
 
3. Socio-Cultural Environments 
 
What are the main reasons for the Chinese people in both China and 
Hong Kong to use non-judicial mechanisms to defend their individual rights?  
The answers are primarily to be found in their socio-cultural environments.  
Through a search of the media and social scientists’ interviews and surveys 
and a study of the socio-cultural environments of the two Chinese societies, 
three reasons stand out: the underprivileged socio-economic status, the 
traditional Chinese culture of obeying authority and respecting hierarchical 
structure, and the tradition of reluctance to go to court. 
 
1) The unequal distribution of social wealth and the privileges of the 
“haves” vs. the underprivileged “have-nots” 
 
Many socio-legal studies have pointed out that the rich or the higher 
classes in a hierarchical society are less subject to the restrictions of law than 
those middle or lower classes.11  The previous discussion also demonstrates 
that such a situation is generally true in the two Chinese societies.  By the 
same token, those who are in the lower part of the social strata and those who 
have limited financial and political resources are less likely to take legal 
actions to redress their grievances. 
In the past two decades or so, China has been undertaking dramatic 
reforms and maintained an amazingly high pace of economic growth.  One of 
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the direct consequences of these changes is the ever-growing gap between the 
rich and the poor.  China has rapidly moved from the world’s most populous 
egalitarian society to one of those countries which have the most unequal 
social wealth distributions.  One direct consequence of this polarisation of 
social wealth in China is a growing population of the underprivileged class. 
Hong Kong has long experienced an unequal distribution problem.  
Since the return of sovereignty to China in 1997, the gap between the poor 
and the rich has been on a widening trend.  The SAR government, which has 
sometimes been criticised for its lack of sympathy to the underprivileged 
social groups, does not always provide strong leadership in safeguarding 
individual rights of its residents.  Tension would occur between the 
government and the powerless people in a worse economic situation when the 
latter believed that their basic individual rights were threatened.  Both in 
China and Hong Kong, those who rank low in the socio-economic strata are 
more likely to take non-judicial mechanisms to fight for their rights. 
Why would the underprivileged be less likely to resort to legal means 
when their individual rights are at stake?  Several factors can contribute to 
this tendency.  First, it is the limited economic resources that prevent those 
people from taking legal actions.  Law suits are costly in societies, and 
especially in Hong Kong.  Many of them cannot afford to pay the legal fees.  
Even if they are lucky, as in the case of Hong Kong, to get assistance from 
the Legal Aid Department, they may still not be able to go through the time-
consuming legal process.  It is clear that there exists an unbalanced 
accessibility to justice between individuals of different social status.  
Researchers show that the underprivileged made only limited use of legal 
resources and law.12  A second factor is that most of these underprivileged 
people do not have sufficient knowledge about litigation.  Their educational 
background and their limited access to the necessary information gives them 
no option but to choose the more familiar non-judicial mechanisms to redress 
their right damages.  Another factor is that they either predict or already 
know that there is little chance for them to win the case in court, they would 
like to seek non-judicial help.  For example, in the “right of abode” case, 
when the applicants lost their case, then they turned to public help.  In this 
situation, non-judicial mechanisms could be their last hope, even though they 
knew they may not be the effective means to get what they fought for.  Some 
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non-judicial means, such as public opinion, may not always stand by the side 
of the underprivileged. 
It should be pointed out that legal and constitutional rights in themselves 
do not change people’s social attitudes towards the law.  The rich have more 
resources at their disposal to tilt the law in their favour.  In the longer run 
public attitudes toward those whose individual rights are allegedly violated 
are conditioned by economic pressures.   That is to say, even those who may 
not belong to the “haves” class may give in to the economic pressure and 
support those “haves” against those “have-nots.”13  This unfortunate situation 
would in turn force those “have-nots” to appeal directly to non-judicial means 
when their constitutionally entitled rights are at stake.  The most illustrating 
case is the “right of abode” issue in Hong Kong.  Most Hong Kong residents 
know that the Court of Final Appeal’s ruling is based on the interpretation of 
the Basic Law.  However, when the HKSAR government, dissatisfied with 
the court rulings, sought a re-interpretation from the Central Government and 
began to warn its residents that a flood of new immigrants would enter the 
territory if the Court’s ruling stood, many Hong Kong residents began to 
change their attitudes.  They feared that in a worse economic situation, these 
new immigrants would fight with them for the limited jobs.14 
 
2) Chinese obedience of authority and hierarchical structure: the difference in 
sub-political cultures in the Mainland and Hong Kong 
 
Ethnicity is one of the components of this social-legal construct.  
Chinese societies are deeply rooted in Confucian thought, which, among 
other things, stresses on the respect for authority and for hierarchical 
arrangements of society in accordance with people’s social status.  In most of 
the western societies, such individual rights as freedom of speech and 
freedom of migration are considered as sacred rights.  Governments cannot 
do anything but to act in accordance with these social norms.  In Chinese 
societies, on the contrary, those rights are not necessarily born with but rather 
given by “wise” governments or monarchs. 
Needless to say, China is not a country with a constitutionalist tradition. 
Two major factors have hindered its people’s general awareness of their 
fundamental rights: its historical heritage and its current political system.  For 
thousands of years, the Chinese people's best hope to protect their lives and 
 17
property was not a trusty government with limited power but a wise emperor 
who understood the hardships of the people.  The feudal principles, such as 
"when an emperor wants his subject to die, the latter should die 
unhesitatingly," were deeply rooted in the minds of ordinary Chinese people.  
To make the situation more complicated in contemporary China, it is also a 
socialist country.  Different from most of the Western democracies, the 
fundamental decision-making principle in China is democratic centralism.  Its 
decision-making mechanism allows only limited discussion and consultation 
at lower levels.  The final decision power is reserved for the top leadership. 
Naturally, the Chinese people are expected to obey the authorities and worse, 
they are accustomed to this pattern of behaviour.  So, when their individual 
rights are at stake, their first reaction would be to go to the authority to get 
justice back rather than to take a legal action.  In other words, they would 
trust the administrative authority more than the legal system.  This partially 
explains the fact that although there are very few lawyers in China, they have 
few cases to represent too. 
 
3) It’s shameful to appear in court 
 
If Alexis de Tocqueville ever traveled to China, he would have made a 
totally different observation from his famous remarks on the legalistic 
orientation of North America.  Instead of bringing up every dispute to court, 
the Chinese would rather settle down outside of the court whenever possible.  
This reflects a fundamental difference between the Chinese tradition and 
western traditions.  On the one hand, the American society “bottoms its 
systematic definition of individual rights and duties, as well as its machinery 
for dispute settlement, not on custom or the will of strategically placed 
individuals, but on the common-law model. It is to courts, or other quasi-
judicial official bodies, that we ultimately look for the implementation of a 
regularized, orderly process of dispute settlement.”15  On the other hand, the 
Chinese tradition considers it a shameful thing to be involved in any litigation. 
This tradition is rooted in the legal thought that “one is assumed guilty 
till he can provehis innocence in court.”  This is an opposite logic from the 
western society’s “presumed innocence” principle.  That is to say, if one goes 
to the court in China, he will have to bear the pressure that in the eyes of the 
public he is already a guilty person.  Worse, in many cases even if he can win 
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the case, the shadow of being suspected as guilty still follows him and it takes 
a long time to get rid of this. 
Other than the tarred image of going to court, the reluctance to settle 
disputes in court is also attributed to the relatively low mobility of Chinese 
societies.  Many of them live in the same hometown for generations and it 
would be “embarrassing” for them (and their families and relatives) to see 
each other if they have both appeared in court.  It would be a face-saving 
thing to settle their disputes through non-judicial means.  
 
III. Non-judicial Mechanisms 
 
In most of the contemporary states, individual rights are protected by 
constitutions and various laws based on constitutional principals.  However, 
in most of the nations, individual rights are not adequately protected by 
constitutional and other legal arrangements.  Some of these inadequacies are 
caused by institutional defects, some simply because there are lack of legal 
professionals, such as the case of China.  Between 1996 and 2000, the 
number of China’s law firms was raised from 8,265 to 9.541, and lawyers 
from 100,198 to 117,260.  Of these lawyers, only 69,117 were full-time and 
others were either part-time or doing other legal-related works.16  That is to 
say, in a population of 1.3 billion, every lawyer, full-time or part-time, have 
to serve the needs of over 11,000 customers.  In comparison, Hong Kong has 
780 practising barristers and 4,871 solicitors.17 This means there is one full-
time practising lawyer for every 1,200 Hong Kong residents.  The ratio is 
almost ten times higher than that in China.  This has not counted foreign 
lawyers and notary public in the HKSAR.  This simple lack of qualified 
professionals in China, and for the other reasons discussed above, make the 
Chinese people seek other means to handle their legal problems. 
There are other means of protection or other ways to deal with 
individual rights violations.  These means are mostly by nature non-judicial.  
Non-judicial mechanism in this study is defined as a way to protect 
constitutionally guaranteed individual rights through administrative, 
communal, social, and other means that do not involve legal settlements.  
Some non-judicial mechanisms are available in most of the modern states, 
some in a few states, and some are particularly suitable for one or two legal 
systems or states.  For example, to protect individual rights through 
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administrative means is available in most of the states, while to offer 
sanctions on individuals whose freedom and rights have been threatened by 
the government is a feature in those Christian states.  To defend individual 
rights on the wronged individuals’ behalf by the civilian networks and even 
quasi-official ones, such as the Neighborhood Committees and the Women’s 
Associations in China, could be the unique means to deal with individual 
rights issues.  The socio-legal approach recognises the need of those ordinary 
citizens to have ways to check the encroachment of their individual rights by 
those established.  Non-judicial means are necessary supplements to those 
legal means, as the latter are usually working to the benefit of the established. 
Although there are varieties of non-judicial mechanisms adopted and 
practised in China, they may be grouped in one broad concept: social network.  
Studies on social networks have been one major characteristic of sociology 
and political science.  Most of the research focuses on how the social network 
is created and developed and its consequences to the society and political and 
economic systems.18  Social network, however, has rarely been attributed to 
the rise and maintenance of non-judicial mechanisms in defending individual 
rights and freedoms in a society. 
 Chinese societies have been known for their complicated social 
networks.  The long and relatively uninterrupted civilisation and the key 
ethical principle of worshipping ancestors ensures that any Chinese person  is 
surrounded by various networks.  Kinship, for example, is one important 
component of such a network.  Working unit or Danwei is another obvious 
example.  However, in Hong Kong, the social network is less visible.  Its 
non-judicial mechanisms usually have a general character of public pressure.  
This is mainly because of the different socio-legal settings and the legal 
culture its people inherited from the colonial times. 
 
1. Non-judicial mechanisms in China 
 
 In China, when people feel their individual rights are violated and when 
legal solutions either are denied accessibility or are too costly, they are likely 
to find other non-judicial channels.  Some non-judicial mechanisms are used 
in specific occasions, some have more general applicability. 
 
1) Party solutions 
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In China, one of the most commonly used non-judicial mechanisms to 
punish those who have violated the individual rights of its citizens is through 
Communist Party disciplines.  This is usually the case when ordinary 
citizens’ individual rights and freedoms are violated by the government 
officials who usually also hold important Party positions.  In many incidents, 
to give an “internal warning” to the involved Party member would be an 
indication of his/ her setback in the government career.  A deprivation of 
Party membership is the severest punishment, and usually involved with 
those government officials who would have been sentenced later by the 
judicial tribunals for the crimes they have committed. 
Because it is a widely accepted punishment for those Party member 
officials, the Chinese people would go to the local CCP committee to 
complain and to request it discipline the involved officials.  In many cases, 
this would be a satisfactory result for both parties involved if the request has 
been considered and the disciplinary punishment has been made.  For the 
ordinary individual, his or her grievances have been redressed.  For the 
concerned official, he may have avoided legal consequences. 
 In recent years, this means has been less applied by the ordinary people, 
as the CCP members gradually lose their privileges and the membership 
cards are no longer considered as the only path to higher and economically 
more profitable positions. 
 
2) Third Party Mediations 
 
Mediations have been widely used in China.  Usually the concerned 
parties are not very confrontational and no criminal cases are involved.  
Through mediations by a third party, both concerned individuals would have 
room to bargain and to compromise.  For example, if an individual wants to 
take back a property such as an apartment, which has been occupied by 
another working unit (this often happened before the residential shelters in 
China became commercialised), the individual would very likely find a third 
party that has amicable relations with both involved parties.  Through the 
help of this third party, a compromise is expected to be reached and the 
concerned parties would not necessarily leave on bad terms. 
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3) Working units involvement 
 
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of non-judicial mechanisms in 
China concerning the protection of individual rights is the intervention of the 
concerned parties’ working units.  Prior to the reform era, almost all of the 
Chinese were employed in one or another working units, known as “Danwei” 
in Chinese.  A Danwei is a miniature society itself, composing of its own 
“executive” hierarchies, its own “legislative” branches (such as the workers 
assembly that made regulations and rules for its own workers and managers), 
and its own “quasi-judicial” branches (such as the various disciplinary 
committees and the workers’ pickets).  In addition, a Danwei also has its own 
welfare departments and other logistic individuals. 
The advantages to seek a working unit solution are obvious: usually the 
unit has experts in handling various kinds of disputes.  It is convenient and 
resourceful.  It also provides necessary authority and legitimacy when a 
solution is found.  Moreover, it is the least costly way to protect individual 
rights from being encroached on by others. 
 
4) Neighbourhood or community involvement 
 
Another distinctive feature of Chinese social networks is the role of 
neighbourhood or community organisations.  Contemporary China has a 
unique population control system called “Hu Kou” or “local residence 
registration” system.  Every individual in the urban areas is required to 
register to the local police branches, which in turn provides the related 
information to the community or neighbourhood committees.   These 
committees are not part of the government apparatus, yet their power over the 
local residence should not be underestimated.   If anyone knows the details of 
one’s privacy, he or she comes from these committees.  Therefore, their 
intervention in solving some individual rights problems is granted. 
 
5) Family and social connections 
 
By and large, family ties remain one of the most important and 
accessible mechanisms for those who feel that their constitutional rights have 
been ignored or violated.  This is especially true in rural areas.   When an 
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individual feels that his/her rights have been violated by either government 
branches or officials, the first idea that comes to his/her mind is to search for 
a “powerful” relative who can help them.  With various social networks and a 
low mobility, usually there are always some local officials who are related to 
the individuals and who are willing to intervene. 
 It must be pointed out that non-judicial mechanisms do not always 
work.  Some of them  lack authority and their solutions may not be 
recognised by the concerned parties.  In a number of events, non-judicial 
mechanisms only provide a preliminary solution and the final solution still 
rests in the power of a legal tribunal. 
 
2. Non-judicial mechanisms in Hong Kong 
 
1) Media exposure 
 
Deborah Rhode’s study reveals the formative role of the news media in 
shaping public and elite images regarding law.19  The Hong Kong media is a 
very competitive market.  Newspapers and other media try very hard to bring 
about “explosive” news to the public in order to boost heir sales.  To report 
social injustice is obviously one of the most effective ways to attract an 
audience.  Thus, journalists in Hong Kong often serve as “watch-dogs” of 
government policies.  This role of journalism has enabled some Hong Kong 
residents to make use of it to appeal to the public for support when they feel 
their constitutionally-entitled rights have been ignored or violated.  In a 
number of cases, those who feel wrongly treated by the authority would first 
report to the newspapers before any further actions are taken. 
Media as a non-judicial mechanism has its limitations.  In some cases, 
media exposure only complicates the case and makes it harder to reach a 
legal solution.  In some other incidences, the media gets itself involved in 
legal actions and has to make proper compensation to the involved party. 
 
2) NGO assistance 
 
Unlike China, where NGOs have been under strict control, NGO 
activities in Hong Kong are both guaranteed by the Basic Law (Art. 149) and 
prosperous in local communities.  Most important human rights NGOs have 
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their local chapters in Hong Kong.  They pay close attention to any signs of 
human rights violations by the government. 
One obvious example of NGOs safeguarding the individual rights of the 
underprivileged people is the association of the Philippine domestic helpers 
in Hong Kong.  There are close to 180,000 Philippine domestic helpers 
(maids) in Hong Kong and some of them have been coerced or even abused 
by their employers.  With limited financial resources and the risk of losing 
jobs, many of them would be reluctant to take legal actions.  However, with 
the help of this NGO, things are different. 
 
3) Community service 
 
As an international metropolis, Hong Kong gives the impression that 
community ties are not obvious.  However, in some areas (such as the 
original New Territory residents) and in some sectors (such as construction 
workers and domestic helpers) the sense of being in a community is strongly 
felt.  Religion often serves as a bridge to connect local residents.  In the 
recent cases concerning child abuse by a few Catholic priests, the 
community’s role is obvious. 
 
4) Public pressure 
 
Though in general the Hong Kong public is not keen to be involved in 
political activities and particularly those sensitive radical activities, it would 
be wrong to assume that public pressure can be ignored.  In many policy 
areas the government is required by law to consult the general public and if 
the public opposition to the policy is high, it is very likely the government 
would modify or even withdraw the proposed policies.  In the field of 
protecting individual rights, public opinion against government intervention 
in academic freedom made the Vice chancellor of the Hong Kong University 
lose his job. 
 
Other than those listed above, there are other non-judicial mechanisms 
practised in the two Chinese societies.  The role of non-judicial mechanisms 
should not be ignored and cannot be ignored.  It is significant in serving as 
supplementary means to judicial solutions and as stabilising elements in 
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society.  Its social functions have yet to be fully explored and its significance 
to be discovered. 
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